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1 Introduction
Negotiations often share the following two features. First, players revise initial claims
in order to reach a compromise. Their ability to make revisions depends on the context
of the negotiations and may di¤er among players. Second, concessions may be induced
by the threat of an ultimate take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. However, negotiators discourage
such uncompromising behavior by adopting a rm posture - threatening to walk away
from negotiations without agreement - when facing such an ultimatum. These two
features are extensively discussed in the negotiation literature (Sebenius 1992, Lewicki
et al. 1994) and also appear in practical guides for negotiators, as in the defense
procurement and acquisition guidelines by the US Department of Defense:1 Aim high
but Give yourself room to compromiseand Be willing to walk away from or back
to negotiations.
In the bargaining literature, Harsanyi (1977) justied the solution of Nash (1950)
by comparing the risk limits of players in the pursuit of their claims. A players risk
limit is the highest probability of disagreement that he would accept in the pursuit of
his claim in an ultimatum, when accepting his opponents claim is the alternative. The
player with higher risk limit is in a weak bargaining position and is more likely to accept
his opponents claim. Since a lower claim decreases the own risk limit and increases the
opponents risk limit, players avoid a weak bargaining position by exhibiting restraint
in the formulation of their claims. Risk limits are equalized if each player claims his
payo¤ in the Nash solution.
Moulin (1984) justied the solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) in an auction
in which each player bids a probability of disagreement when an uncompromising oppo-
nent pursues his dictatorial outcome in an ultimatum. The player with the lower bid is
given the advantage to propose any feasible utility allocation as a compromise. Hence,
the competition for rst-mover advantage rewards restraint in the choice of resistance
probabilities against uncompromising behavior. In a maxmin equilibrium of the bid-
ding strategies, both players commit to equal resistance probabilities which eliminates
rst-mover advantage. They both propose the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in which
they reduce their claims in the same proportion. In particular, this solution solves the
trade-o¤ for each player between the commitment to higher resistance in order to deter
uncompromising behavior and the commitment to lower resistance in order to obtain
a leadership position.
In his justication of the Nash solution, Harsanyi assumed that claims cannot be re-
vised, leaving little room to compromise. In his justication of the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution, Moulin assumed that players pursue their dictatorial outcomes in an ultima-
tum, excluding restraint in the formulation of claims. The two approaches motivate the
1The Contract Pricing Reference Guides (Vol5, Ch6) of the DPAP of the US Department of Defense,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpf/docs/contract_pricing_nance_guide/vol5_ch6.pdf .
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analysis of a mechanism with four stages showing how avoidance of a weak bargaining
position and competition for rst-mover advantage interact. Players start by making
claims, as in Harsanyi. In the second stage, players bid resistance probabilities, as in
Moulin. Leadership is acquired by the player with the lowest bid. In the third stage,
the leader proposes a compromise within the set of feasible compromises which depends
on his claim but remains beyond his control in all other respects. In the nal stage, the
follower accepts or rejects the compromise. If he rejects, then he obtains his claim in an
ultimatum unless he meets resistance to which the leader is committed by the second
stage; the negotiations end in disagreement with the leaders resistance probability.
The single distinguishing feature of these games is the extent to which claims can
be subsequently revised. The revision procedure denes the Pareto-e¢ cient maximal
revision of each players claim. The room to compromise is the gap between the maxi-
mal utility which a player can give to his opponent in the maximal revision and in the
pursuit of his claim. The Nash solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are imple-
mented in subgame-perfect equilibrium in the extreme cases excluding or admitting all
revisions respectively. The main contribution of this paper is the highlighting of when
and how the strategic justications of Moulin and Harsanyi interact for intermediate
revision procedures considered in the negotiation literature. The key in this interaction
is the new concept of the extended Nash product of a players claim, which multiplies
his claim with the opponents utility in his maximal revision. The player with the
larger extended Nash product of his claim is the strong player as he needs a lower
resistance probability to impose his maximal revision which avoids an ultimatum. In
particular, players face a trade-o¤ between claiming more so as to achieve more in an
ultimatum and claiming less so as to obtain a strong bargaining position. This allows
us to analyze how the aforementioned features in the negotiations literature play out
in equilibrium. Players should not only aim high when formulating claims, but also
leave su¢ cient room to compromise in order to obtain a strong bargaining position.
The paper shows that in equilibrium there is interaction between both strategic
justications in intermediate revision procedures, with two exceptions. Players restrain
their claims which makes them equally strong, as in Harsanyi, but at the same time they
restrain their resistance so that their concessions stand in the same proportion to their
claims, as in Moulin. We distinguish between two cases. In the rst case, maximal
revisions are incompatible. Competition for the strong bargaining position induces
restraint in the formulation of claims, unless one player has a claim which puts him in
a strong bargaining position for all claims of the other player. The strong player imposes
his maximal revision for the largest of such claims in the rst exception. Otherwise, at
least one of the players gains by reducing his claim, which closes the gap between the
maximal revisions or makes them compatible. In the second case, maximal revisions
are compatible. The proportional solution in which the playersutilities stand in equal
proportion to their claims is a feasible compromise. The competition for leadership
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equalizes the players resistance probabilities by adopting Moulins maxmin bidding
strategies. By the monotonicity of the proportional solution for strictly compatible
maximal revisions, each player gains by increasing his claim, unless claims are maximal.
Players agree on the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in the second exception. Otherwise,
none of the players can gain by changing his claim only when maximal revisions meet for
claims with equal extended Nash products. The maximal revisions of the equilibrium
claims meet in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for the bargaining problem with these
claims as ideal points.
The mechanism underlines that room to compromise is essential for a strong bar-
gaining position, as recommended in the negotiation literature. When a negotiator is
able - for a claim below his maximal claim - to increase his opponents payo¤ in his
maximal revision, larger extended Nash products improve his bargaining position al-
lowing for a better deal. A negotiator gains in equilibrium by facing fewer restrictions
regarding the revisions of all claims below his maximal claim. Still, such exogenous
restrictions can be important in particular contexts. For example, restrictions on revi-
sions can be explicitly specied in the mandate given to the negotiator by his principal
or arise from costs of revising initial plans. The restrictions may also arise from unful-
lled expectations raised by the initial claims or from aversion to making concessions.
In these examples, one expects better agreements for negotiators who do not fear to
disappoint their principals or suppress their frustration. Our analysis sheds light on
this, evaluating more generally the impact of revision procedures on the bargaining
outcome.
The mechanism also claries the role of ultimatums with endogenously chosen risk
of disagreement needed for imposing a compromise. This is further illustrated for un-
restricted revisions in the alternating-o¤er game (Rubinstein (1982)). In each round
the responder can stop negotiations in an ultimatum and the proposer needs time to
build resistance in order to deter such ultimatum for a better deal. The introduc-
tion of ultimatums moves the equilibrium outcome away from the Nash solution - the
equilibrium solution of the alternating-o¤er game with equal waiting times - towards
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution - the equilibrium solution of the four-stage mechanism
with unrestricted revisions.
Related Literature According to Nash (1953), the relevance of a solution concept is
enhanced if one arrives at it from very di¤erent points of view. The Nash program, as
reviewed in Thomson (2010), attempts to complement the axiomatic properties of solu-
tion concepts with non-cooperative foundation. While Harsanyi (1977), Moulin (1984),
Binmore et al. (1986) and Howard (1992) implement the Nash program for a single bar-
gaining solution, we achieve implementation for a family of solutions in subgame-perfect
equilibrium, as Miyagawa (2002) and Anbarci and Boyd (2011). Miyagawas mecha-
nism implements any solution that maximizes a welfare function belonging to a set
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of quasi-concave functions, including the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. The
second player counters the o¤er of the rst player, but this o¤er is restricted to provide
the same aggregate welfare as the rst o¤er. In the mechanism of Anbarci and Boyd,
compatible utility allocations are implemented in a rst stage and incompatible utility
allocations are implemented with equal probability in a second stage, unless there is an
exogenously imposed probability of disagreement. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is
the unique robust solution which both players demand above a threshold. There is no
general robustness ranking for other solutions. We propose a mechanism with endoge-
nously chosen probability of disagreement which occurs only o¤ the equilibrium path
and which induces restraint in the claims depending on the revision procedure. Inter-
estingly, we nd the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for two opposite extremes.
By considering intermediate revision procedures, we are able to compare and deepen
our insight in Harsanyis and Moulins seminal contributions to the Nash program.
Schelling (1956) discusses take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers and commitments as strategy de-
vices. Kahneman and Tversky (1995) show that loss aversion appears as concession
aversion in the context of negotiations. The experimental literature shows that people
accept losses by rejecting unfair outcomes in ultimatums (Camerer (2003)). Punishing
unfair treatment is rationalized in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We refer to this liter-
ature to justify the commitment of accepting the loss of disagreement with positive
probability in an ultimatum.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section denes the bargaining problem,
the four-stage mechanism and the revision procedures. Section 3 analyzes the extreme
revision procedures allowing no or all revisions. Section 4 characterizes the solution
for intermediate revision procedures. We provide examples of revision procedures in
section 5. Before concluding, the robustness of the mechanism is analyzed in section
6. The complete description of the subgame-perfect equilibrium and proofs are given
in appendix.
2 The model
In this section, we dene the bargaining problem and a mechanism for selecting a
solution in the bargaining set.
2.1 The bargaining problem
Let N = f1; 2g be the set of players. The players are male. Player  i is player is
opponent for i 2 N . The closed and convex set S is a subset of D = [0; 1]  [0; 1].
The elements of S are the normalized utility allocations u = (u1; u2) associated with
feasible outcomes, which are known by each player. For i 2 N , the concave function
uP i : [0; 1]! [0; 1] : ui 7! sup fu iju 2 Sg is assumed to be strictly decreasing. It takes
the value uP i (0) = 1 in the dictatorial outcome of player  i and the value uP i (1) = 0
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in the dictatorial outcome of player i. The utility allocation in disagreement is (0; 0).
It follows that the set S denes a strictly comprehensive bargaining problem. The set
of Pareto-e¢ cient utility allocations in S is the Pareto frontier PO(S)  fu 2 Sju2 =
uP2 (u1)g.
2.2 The mechanism
The extensive form of the mechanism   for selecting a solution in S has four stages.
The rst stage is a demand stage, inspired by Harsanyis demand game. Both
players simultaneously formulate utility claims p 2 D, where pi is player is utility
when he successfully pursues his claim in an ultimatum. The second stage is a bidding
stage, inspired by Moulins auction game. Both players simultaneously bid resistance
probabilities q 2 D, where qi is the probability of disagreement when player is opponent
pursues his claim in an ultimatum. The third stage is the compromising stage. The
player with the lowest resistance probability is the leader L, who makes a compromise
proposal. The fourth and nal stage is the approval stage. The follower F accepts Ls
compromise or pursues his claim risking that negotiations end in disagreement with
probability qL.
The claims p of the demand stage serve a double purpose. While player is claim pi
denes his utility when he wins in his ultimatum, it also denes the maximal revision
mi (pi) 2 PO (S) of his claim in the compromising stage, wheremii (pi) is his maximally
revised claim and mi i (pi) is his opponents payo¤ in the maximal revision of his claim.
We consider comprehensive revision procedures.
Denition 1. The revision procedure m =
 
m1;m2

is comprehensive i¤ mi i is a non-
increasing concave function on [0; 1] such that uP i (pi)  mi i (pi)  1 for pi 2 [0; 1]
and i 2 N:
The revision procedure is beyond the control of the players and the single distin-
guishing feature of each mechanism with extensive form  . All comprehensive revision
procedures are collected in the set M. We index the extensive form   for special
comprehensive revision procedures. In  H , as in Harsanyi (1977), no revisions are al-
lowed and each players payo¤ in his maximal revision is equal to his claim, that is,
mii (pi) = pi for pi 2 [0; 1]. In  M ; as in Moulin (1984), unrestricted maximal revisions
of any claim yield the payo¤s of the opponents dictatorial outcome, that is mii (pi) = 0
for pi 2 [0; 1].
The set of player is compromises is
Ci (pi) 

c 2 Sjmii (pi)  ci  pi
	
for pi 2 [0; 1] and m 2M:
We assume for tractibility that a leader can also propose those compromises which are
6
feasible for the follower.2 Hence, the set of feasible compromises is
C (p)  C1(p1) [ C2(p2):
Claims are incompatible if p =2 S. Maximal revisions are incompatible if for incompat-
ible claims C1(p1) \ C2(p2) = ;:
The resistance probabilities in the second stage serve a double purpose as well.
While qi is player is choice of the probability of disagreement when he is leader and
his opponent rejects his compromise in an ultimatum, it also rewards lower resistance
with rst-mover advantage. In case of equal bids, leadership is assigned to player 1 for
some labeling of the players. This rule is a mapping M ! f1; 2g which we dene in
Denition 3. Hence,
L (q) =
(
i if qi < q i;
1 if q1 = q2:
The rules of the mechanism can be summarized as follows:
 Stage 1: All i 2 N formulate claims p 2 D.
 Stage 2: All i 2 N bid resistance probabilities q 2 D.
 Stage 3. The leader L(q) proposes the compromise c 2 C (p).
 Stage 4: The follower F 2 N n fL(q)g chooses R2 fY,Ng.
The payo¤s for player i 2 N are
ui =
8><>:
ci
(1  qL) pF
(1  qL)uPL (pF )
if R = Y,
if R = N and i = F;
if R = N and i = L:
3 Two extreme revision procedures
We start by showing that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Nash solution can be
implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium in mechanisms with the same extensive
form, but with di¤erent procedures for revising claims. All revisions are allowed for the
former and no revisions are allowed for the latter. The non-cooperative justications of
these solutions recast the arguments of Moulin (1984) and Harsanyi (1977) respectively.
2This assumption is relaxed in section 6. In all the mechanisms, we exclude upward revised claims
(mii(pi) > pi) and ine¢ cient revisions (m
i
 i(pi) < u
P
 i (pi)). We also ignore comprehensive bargaining
problems which are not strictly comprehensive. Such extensions would only change strategies without
changing the allocation implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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3.1 The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) proposed the Pareto-e¢ cient allocation uKS(p) for which
uKS1 (p)=p1 = u
KS
2 (p)=p2 as a solution to the reduced bargaining problem
S(p)  fu 2 Sju  pg for p =2 S n PO (S) :
We call uKS(p) the proportional solution of S (p). In this solution, the concessions
are proportional to the claims and the payo¤s are increasing in the own claim. The
mechanism  M with unrestricted revisions provides a non-cooperative justication of
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution of S. Following Moulin (1984), bidding
qKSi (p) = 1 
uKS i (p)
p i
corresponds to a maxmin strategy for player i 2 N . To see this, consider the resistance
probability qi of player i in stage 2. If player i leads the negotiations (i.e. qi  q i),
knowing that his opponent rejects any compromise with payo¤ below (1   qi)p i in
stage 4, he proposes the Pareto-e¢ cient compromise
ci (qi) 2 arg max
c2S(p)
fcij c i  (1  qi)p ig
in stage 3. If the opponent leads the negotiations with bid q i (i.e. q i  qi), then
(1  q i) pi is player is payo¤. Since q i  qi; player is payo¤ as a follower is bounded
from below by (1  qi) pi. Hence, min

cii(qi); (1  qi) pi
	
is a lower bound for his payo¤
when bidding qi. As higher resistance probability increases his payo¤ cii(qi) as leader,
but decreases his payo¤ (1  qi) pi as follower, the minimum of the two payo¤s reaches
a maximum when ui = cii(qi) = (1  qi) pi. Since u i = (1  qi) p i, the payo¤s of the
players stand in the same proportion to their claims in the maxmin bidding strategy of
player i. The resistance probabilities are equal for qKS1 (p) = q
KS
2 (p) and each player
would propose the proportional solution as a leader. Hence, the proportional solution
is implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The stages 2 to 4 of  M recast the mechanism proposed by Moulin (1984) for the
reduced bargaining problem S (p). Since in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for S(p);
uKSi (p) is monotone in pi, nobody shows restraint in the formulation of claims in stage
1 and p = (1; 1) = 1. By augmenting Moulins model with a demand stage,  M justies
Moulins assumption that players make maximal claims.
Proposition 1. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution uKS (1) is implemented in subgame-
perfect equilibrium in the mechanism  M with unrestricted maximal revisions.
Proof. See appendix.
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3.2 The Nash solution
The solution uN of Nash (1950) to a bargaining problem maximizes the Nash product
u1u2 for u 2 S. Harsanyi (1977) derived the Nash solution as an equilibrium for a
demand game in which, according to the conjecture of Zeuthen (1930), the player with
the higher risk limit is in a weak bargaining position and eventually makes concessions.
For player is positive claim pi and his opponents compromise c, his risk limit is dened
as
ri(ci; pi)  max

1  ci
pi
; 0

:
In our setting, the risk limit stands for the highest resistance probability that a follower
in stage four would be willing to face in the pursuit of his claim when accepting the
compromise c is the alternative. In other words, a follower accepts the compromise c
only if his risk limit does not exceed the leaders resistance probability.
The mechanism  H claries why the player with the lower risk limit is in a weak
bargaining position and eventually concedes. In  H , claims cannot be revised. Each
player i obtains his claim pi as a payo¤ in his unique Pareto-e¢ cient compromise
mi (pi) which he prefers to his opponents compromisem i (p i) for incompatible claims
p. If player is risk limit exceeds his opponents, then player i ensures his claim by
bidding a resistance probability qi in between his and his opponents risk limit. As
leader, he is in a strong bargaining position. He obtains leadership for a resistance
probability exceeding his opponents risk limit r i
 
mi i (pi) ; p i

, so that his opponent
accepts mi (pi). On the contrary, his opponent is in a weak bargaining position because
m i (p i) would be rejected when he leads for q i  qi < ri
 
m ii (p i) ; pi

. As leader,
the weak player proposesmi (pi) rather than facing an ultimatum, a lottery withmi (pi)
and the disagreement outcome as prizes. Hence, mi (pi) is implemented.
As in Harsanyis justication of the Nash solution, players compete to be in a strong
bargaining position by adjusting their claims to have the higher risk limit. The player i
with the higher risk limit has the higher Nash product mi i (pi) pi. For pi = u
N
i , player
i maximizes the Nash product of his claim, so that his risk limit is never below his
opponents. This claim ensures a strong bargaining position for incompatible claims.
None of the players can receive a payo¤ below his payo¤ in uN , as he would have a
protable deviation. Hence, both players would propose uN as a leader and uN is
implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium in  H .
Proposition 2. The Nash solution uN is implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium
in the mechanism  H without revisions of claims.
Proof. See appendix.
3.3 Discussion
The solutions of Nash and of Kalai and Smorodinsky are implemented in mechanisms
with the same extensive form to be distinguished only by the extent to which claims
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can subsequently be revised. In both mechanisms rst-mover advantage in stage 3
disappears in equilibrium since, respectively for c = m1 (p1) = m2 (p2) = uN and
c = uKS (1),
r1(c1; p1) = r2(c2; p2):
However, the reason for achieving equality of risk limits in the two solutions is di¤erent.
Moulins justication of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution focuses on situations with
compatible maximal revisions. As long as maximal revisions are compatible, there is
no reason to show restraint in claims. However, each player faces a trade-o¤ between
increasing resistance in order to block the other players ultimatum in the pursuit of a
better deal and decreasing resistance to acquire the leadership position. Competition
for leadership forces players to show restraint in their resistance. For maximal claims,
qKSi (1) = r i(u
KS
 i (1); 1) = 1  uKS i (1): The maxmin strategy equalizes the resistance
probabilities leading to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Harsanyis justication of the Nash solution focuses on situations with incompati-
ble maximal revisions. Each player faces a trade-o¤ between decreasing his claim for
obtaining a strong bargaining position and increasing his claim to increase his payo¤
in his ultimatum. Competition to be in a strong bargaining position forces players to
show restraint in claims. As long as the strong players claim exceeds his payo¤ in
the Nash solution, his strong bargaining position can be put in jeopardy. The weak
player can become strong for a claim with a larger Nash product and become leader
for a lower resistance probability. Hence, both players claim their payo¤s in the Nash
solution. Without revisions, mii (pi) = pi. Since maximal revisions are the same in
equilibrium, restraint in claims drives the risk limits towards zero (ri(uNi ; u
N
i ) = 0).
4 Comprehensive revision procedures
This section analyzes the interaction of Harsanyis and Moulins justication of a bar-
gaining solution for any comprehensive revision procedure. For any positive claim,
unlike in  H , maximal revisions may increase the opponents payo¤, but, unlike in  M ,
may remain incompatible: In order to characterize a strong bargaining position, we
introduce the concept of the extended Nash product of a players claim, the product of
a players claim and his opponents utility in the maximal revision of his claim. The
player with the larger extended Nash product is the strong player who imposes his max-
imal revision or the proportional solution, as he prefers. The solution in   for m 2M
can therefore be obtained in a two-stage mechanism in which the strong player imposes
his preferred option after both players formulated their claims. With two exceptions,
the maximal revisions meet in the proportional solution for the equilibrium claims.
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4.1 Bidding Resistance Probabilities: the Extended Nash Product
The minimal resistance probability needed by player i to impose his maximal revision
mi (pi) is
i(p)  r i(mi i (pi) ; p i) for i 2 N: (1)
For all concessions in Ci (pi) other than player is maximal revision, the opponents
risk limit exceeds i (p). We therefore say that the player with the higher minimal
resistance probability is in a weak bargaining position because he, unlike his opponent,
can no longer impose a compromise within his set of feasible compromises as a leader
when his opponent bids a resistance probability strictly in between 1 (p) and 2 (p).
From (1),
i(p)   i(p) i¤ pimi i (pi)  p im ii (p i) for i 2 N:
Denition 2. The product pimi i (pi) is the extended Nash product of player is claim
pi.
The characterization of the weak and the strong player by Harsanyi (1977) remains
valid with revisions of claims by extending the concept of the Nash product. The
extended Nash product and the Nash product coincide when no revisions are allowed.
For m 2 M, the claim p^i which maximizes the unimodal extended Nash product of
player is claim is unique. A strong bargaining position is valuable in the competition
for leadership. Recall that leadership is given to the player with label 1 in case both
players bid equal resistance probabilities.
Denition 3. The player with the label 1 for m 2M is a player for whom p^1m12 (p^1) 
p^2m
2
1 (p^2) holds.
In case of equal maximized extended Nash products, any preferential treatment can
be excluded by giving the label 1 to each player with equal probability.
Denition 4. Player s is strong and player w is weak for claims p which are not
strictly compatible
(i) if psmsw (ps) > pwm
w
s (pw) ;
(ii) if psmsw (ps) = pwm
w
s (pw) with s = 1; w = 2.
The characterization of the strong and weak player allows us to combine Harsanyis
approach with an emphasis on the importance of a strong bargaining position with
Moulins approach with an emphasis on the competition for leadership.3 As in Harsanyi,
the strong players strategic advantage is driven by the rst-mover advantage of the
player bidding lower resistance probability when maximal revisions are incompatible.
By bidding a resistance probability in between s (p) and w(p) in case (i) of Denition
3We always explicitly mention the claims p for which one of the players is given the label s. The
player s who is strong for p may remain strong or may become weak for other claims.
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4, the strong player is strong enough to impose his maximal revision as a leader. If
the weak player becomes leader by underbidding the strong player, the weak players
minimal resistance probability is too high for imposing his maximal revision. As a
leader, the weak player proposes a compromise within the strong players set of feasible
compromises, which he prefers to the strong players ultimatum, a lottery with as
prizes the disagreement outcome and the outcome in which the strong player obtains
his unrevised claim.
In case (ii) of Denition 4, 1 (p) = 2 (p). By the labeling of the players, s = 1 for
p. By the rule assigning leadership, L (q) = 1 for q1  q2 and L (q) = 2 for q2 < q1:
If maximal revisions are incompatible for claims with equal extended Nash products,
then only player 1s maximal revision can be implemented. However, player 2 can
undo player 1s advantage and become strong by any small reduction of p2 > p^2 or
by claiming p^2, unless player 1 has a claim for which he is strong for all claims of
player 2 when p^1m12 (p^1) > p^2m
2
1 (p^2). In that case, existence of an equilibrium in the
formulation of claims requires that a tie (q1 = q2) is resolved in favor of player 1.
If the proportional solution is a feasible compromise, any player can make sure
that it is implemented by Moulins maxmin bidding strategy of resistance. Since both
players propose the same compromise as a leader, leadership and the labeling of the
players does not matter. The proportional solution is a feasible compromise only if it
is weakly preferred by the strong player to his maximal revision. This follows from
qKSi (p)  i(p) i¤ uKS (p) 2 Ci (pi) for p =2 S n PO (S) : (2)
an immediate implication of (1), the monotonicity of r i (:; p i) and qKS1 (p) = qKS2 (p).
It follows that acquiring a strong bargaining position is valuable only if w(p) 
s (p) > q
KS
s (p) for incompatible maximal revisions. In that case, the strong player
prefers his maximal revision to the proportional solution so that qKSs (p) > rs (m
s
s (ps) ; ps).
If the weak player leads for qw 2 [rs (mss (ps) ; ps) ; s (p)], he is strong enough to impose
ms (ps), his preferred outcome in Cs (ps). If s = 1 and qs 2 [s (p) ; w(p)], the weak
player leads for qw < qs  w(p) and is never strong enough to impose mw (pw) as a
leader. The strong player is just strong enough to impose ms (ps) when he leads for
qs = s (p). In both cases, m
s (ps) is implemented.
Lemma 1. If u is the solution in   for m 2M in a subgame in which the claims are
not strictly compatible, then u is the proportional solution if it is a feasible compromise
and the strong players maximal revision otherwise.
Proof. See appendix.
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4.2 Formulating Claims: a Simple Demand Game
We now characterize the equilibrium claims in the rst stage. By Lemma 1, the relevant
set of compromises for claims which are not strictly compatible is
C^i(p) 

mi(pi); u
KS(p)
	
for i 2 N .
If claims p are strictly compatible, player 1 is sure to be leader for q1 = 0 and player
2 accepts
 
uP1 (p2) ; p2

which gives him the payo¤ of his ultimatum. Hence, the four-
stage mechanism   for the m 2M can be reformulated as a two-stage mechanism  ^ à
la Nashs demand game:
 Stage a. All i 2 N formulate claims p 2 D.
 Stage b.
 If claims are strictly compatible, player 1 selects
 
uP1 (p2) ; p2

.
 If claims are not strictly compatible, the strong player s for the claims p
selects an allocation in C^s(p).
Formulating strictly compatible claims will not occur in equilibrium because player
2 has a protable deviation. For claims which are not strictly compatible, each player
faces the trade-o¤ between increasing his claim - which increases his own payo¤ as
the strong player - and reducing his claim - which may make him strong and which is
valuable only if the proportional solution is not a feasible compromise. For p0 such that
p0i  pi and p0 i = p i, the following two inequalities determine the equilibrium claims,
min
c2C^ i(p)
ci  max
c2C^i(p)
ci  max
c2C^i(p0)
ci. (3)
By the rst inequality of (3), player i prefers selecting his preferred allocation in
C^i (p) to leaving this choice to his opponent in C^ i(p). The rst-mover advantage
max

mii (pi) ; u
KS
i (p)
	 minm ii (p i) ; uKSi (p)	 is strictly positive, unless the pro-
portional solution is feasible for compatible maximal revisions and the identity of the
leader does not matter. By the second inequality of (3), the strong player gains by
increasing his claim as long as he remains strong, because max

mii(pi); u
KS
i (p)
	
is
strictly increasing in pi for a comprehensive revision procedure.
Lemma 2. If u is the solution in   for m 2 M in subgame-perfect equilibrium, then
the equilibrium claims p  p^ are not strictly compatible. If u is the solution in a sub-
game with claims p  p^ for which player i is strong, then ui  max

mii (p
0
i) ; u
KS
i (p
0)
	
for p0i  pi and p0 i = p i: Moreover, if player i is strong for any claim of player  i
when claiming pi, then pi  pi in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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4.3 Implementing Bargaining Solutions
If the rst weak inequality of (3) is satised with equality for C^1(p) = C^2(p) =
uKS (p)
	
; then uKS (p) = m1 (p1) = m2 (p2) is implemented by Lemma 1. This
is the case with two exceptions.
If the maximal revisions of claims are incompatible, competition for the strong
bargaining position induces restraint in the formulation of claims, unless one player has
a claim for which he is strong for all claims of the weak player. Hence, as in subcase
(a) or (b) in case (ii) of Proposition 3, this player imposes his maximal revision for the
largest of such claims. Otherwise, at least one of the players would gain by closing the
gap between the maximal revisions or by making them compatible, which cannot occur
in equilibrium.
If the maximal revisions of claims are compatible, the proportional solution is a
feasible compromise. The competition for leadership equalizes the players resistance
probabilities by adopting Moulins maxmin bidding strategies. By the monotonicity of
the proportional solution, each player gains by increasing his claim for strictly com-
patible maximal revisions, unless the proportional solution is a feasible compromise for
the maximal claims of the players, as in case (i) of Proposition 3. In that case, the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is implemented.
If case (i) and (ii) do not hold, the maximal revisions meet for claims with equal
extended Nash products and players are equally strong, as in Harsanyi. But the conces-
sions stand also in the same proportion to the claims, as in Moulin. The Pareto-e¢ cient
frontier of the reduced bargaining problem S (p) is the union of the Pareto-e¢ cient
frontiers of the compromise sets C1 (p1) and C2 (p1) which meet in uKS (p).
Proposition 3. The solution u in   for m 2 M in subgame-perfect equilibrium is
unique. The solution u and the claims p are uniquely dened by
u = m1 (p1) = m
2 (p2) = u
KS(p);
with the following exceptions:
(i) if uKS (1) 2 C (1),
then u = uKS (1) and p = 1;
(ii) if uKS (1) =2 C (1),
(a) if m12 (1)  m21 (p^2) p^2;
then u = m1 (1) and m11 (1)  uKS1 (p) for p1 = 1;
(b) if m12 (1) < m
2
1 (p^2) p^2 = m
1
2 (p1) p1 and C1(p1) \ C2 (p^2) = ;,
then u = m1 (p1) and p = (p1; p^2),
(c) if ms (~ps) = mw (~pw) = uKS(~p) and s is strong for ~p and ~ps = 1,
then u = ms (1) and mss (1)  uKSs (p) for ps = 1:
Proof. See appendix.
The equilibrium claims are uniquely dened with the exception of subcases (a) and
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(c) of Proposition 3. If the strong player weakly prefers the maximal revision of his
maximal claim to the proportional solution for some claim of the weak player which is
not maximal, then this will also be the case for all larger claims of the weak player.
4.4 Unilateral Extension of Room to Compromise
We show that a negotiator cannot loose in equilibrium by facing fewer restrictions
regarding the revisions he can make for identical maximal revision of his maximal
claim. Consider the revision procedure
 
m1; m2
 2 M giving larger payo¤s to player
2 in the maximal revisions of player 1 than in
 
m1;m2
 2 M for claims below player
1s maximal claim. That is, player 1 is given more room to compromise in m than in
m. If u = m1 (p1) = m2 (p2) or u = m1 (p1) in the equilibrium with m, then player
1s extended Nash product is larger than 2s in m for the same p. Since extended
Nash products are unimodal and p  p^, equality of the extended Nash products can be
restored only for a higher claim of player 1 and a lower claim of player 2. In that case,
the player giving himself more room to compromise is rewarded.
Corollary 1. Assume that the solution u for p and the solution u for p are respectively
implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium for m =
 
m1;m2
 2 M and for m = 
m1; m2
 2 M in  . If m2 = m2, m12 (1) = m12 (1) and m12 (p1)  m12 (p1) for all
p1 2 [0; 1], then u1  u1 and p1  p1.
Proof. See appendix.
5 Examples
We characterize the solutions for specic revision procedures and show how these vary
when the revision procedures are adjusted in Example 1 and 2. We relate revision
procedures to the literature in Example 3.
Example 1: Piecewise-Linear Revision Procedure. For c 2 PO (S) ; a  ac
and i 2 N , let
mc;a;i i : [0; 1]! [0; 1] : pi 7! min

a
ci
  c i
ci
pi; 1

:
For a comprehensive revision procedure
 
mc;a;1;mc;a;2

, mc;a;i i is tangent to S for a = a
c
and for i 2 N .
We show that c is the solution in   for
 
mc;a;1;mc;a;2

if the exceptions of Proposition
3 do not hold. Assume that ci  c i and c i+ c1c2 = ~aci  ac. For a 2 [ac; ~aci ], consider
the claims
pc =

a  c1c2
c2
;
a  c1c2
c1

 1:
These claims pc dene maximal revisions which meet in c, that is, c = mc;a;1 (pc1) =
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mc;a;2 (pc2). Moreover, c1=p
c
1 = c2=p
c
2 for c 2 PO (S) implies that c = uKS (pc).4 By
Proposition 3, c is the solution.
The piecewise-linear revision procedure implies that the marginal loss of player  i
in player is maximal revision of an increased claim is equal to the constant c i=ci. This
ratio, measuring the marginal reduction in the room to compromise of larger claims,
uniquely identies the solution for all a in [ac; ~aci ]. Increasing a on [a; ~a
c
i ] increases
pi  mc;a;ii (pi) without changing the solution.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is implemented for c i=ci = 1. Player is payo¤
is increased as this ratio is reduced below 1 above a threshold ~ci i=~c
i
i for which ~a
~ci
i =
a~c
i
. In this way, all elements belonging to [i2N

c 2 PO (S)juKSi (1)  ci  ~cii
	
are
implementable by revision procedures which have a point of tangency with S. The
Nash solution is implemented for ac = 2c1c2 when pc = (c1; c2) = uN is a point of
tangency between the revision procedure and S.5 Myerson (1991) characterized the
Nash solution by this property in Theorem 8.2.6
Finally, consider two revision procedures
 
mc;a;1;mc;a;2

and
 
mc;a;1;mc;a;2

: If a >
a and if the exceptions of Proposition 3 do not hold for both revision procedures, then
player 1s equilibrium payo¤ in the former is increased and player 2s is reduced by
Corollary 1. 
Example 2: Revision Procedures by Scalar Multiplication of S. For   1
and for i 2 N , let
m;i i : [0; 1]! [0; 1] : pi 7! sup fp ij p 2 (S) \Dg :
Scalar multiplication of S yields a family of nested comprehensive revision procedures 
m;1;m;2

, for which m;i i (pi) is constant or continuously increasing in  for xed pi
and for i 2 N .
Let u be the solution and p be the claims which are uniquely dened by u =
m;1 (p1) = m
;2 (p2) = u
KS (p) when the exceptions of Proposition 3 do not hold.
For  = 1; no revisions are allowed as in  N and the Nash solution is implemented
for p = uN . By increasing  above 1, obtain u and p as continuous functions of ,
until one of the exceptions of Proposition 3 holds. For   , the maximal revisions for
maximal claims are compatible and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is implemented.
However, before  is reached, player 1 may impose his maximal revision for his maximal
claim for  2 [~; ]. In that case, m;12 (1) increases continuously in  on [~; ] from
4For pc, mc;a;i i (p
c
i ) =
ai
ci
  c i
ci
a c1c2
c i = c i and
c1
pc1
= c2
pc2
= c1c2
a c1c2 .
5Remark that c i + c1c2 decreases when c i=ci is reduced and player i prefers c 2 PO (S) to uN .
6 If a  ac, case (i) of Proposition 3 holds and uKS (1) is implemented. If a 2 [~aci ; ac], subcase (a)
of case (ii) of Proposition 3 holds. Player i imposes the maximal revision of his maximal claim and
his payo¤ is gradually reduced for larger a to uKSi (1) : Increasing a on [~a
~ci
i ; a
c] recovers all solutions
in

c 2 PO (S)juKSi (1)  ci  ~cii
	
. Unlike the extensive form analyzed in Miyagawa (2002), only a
subset of Pareto-e¢ cient allocations are implemented in   for
 
mc;a;1;mc;a;2

.
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m~;12 (1) to u
KS
2 (1). Hence, all the Pareto-e¢ cient allocations in between the Nash and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are implemented for some  2 [1; ].
In a symmetric bargaining problem, u = uKS (1) = uN is the unique solution for
any . In a non-symmetric bargaining problem, solutions outside the Nash and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution may be implemented and the move from the former to the
latter is not necessarily monotone.7
Finally, consider two revision procedures
 
m;1;m;2

and
 
m;1;m;2

. If  > 
and if the exceptions of Proposition 3 do not hold for both revision procedures, then
player 1s equilibrium payo¤ in the former is increased and player 2s is reduced by
Corollary 1.
Example 3: Accountability and Concession Aversion. We conclude the ex-
amples by relating revision procedures to constraints on revisions discussed in the
literature. For example, Crawford (1982) refers to costs for negotiators who retreat on
a position that they have agreed to defend. If negotiators are agents defending interests
of their principal, they have limited authority and are accountable to their principals.
If revising targets must be justied, revisions of claims will be limited. Kahneman and
Tversky (1995), however, argue that revisions are limited by concession aversion. This
may arise not only because claims raise unfullled expectations, but also because ones
opponent gains in a disproportionate way.
Hence, each restriction k on the revision of player is claims, k = 1; :::;Ki, puts
bounds in two ways. Either, a claim pi bounds the players revised payo¤by b¯
k
i (pi) from
below, so that pi b¯
k
i (pi)  0 is the maximal loss he can bear. Or, a claim pi bounds the
opponents revised payo¤by bk i
 
uP i (pi)

from above, so that bk i
 
uP i (pi)
 uP i (pi) 
0 is the maximal gain of his opponent he can tolerate. It follows that, mi i (pi) 
bk i (pi), where b
k
 i (pi) = u
P
 i(b¯
k
i (pi)) in the former or b
k
 i (pi) = b
k
 i
 
uP i (pi)

in the
latter. Hence, for non-increasing concave bk i,
8
mi i (pi) = min
n
b1 i (pi) ; :::; b
Ki
 i (pi) ; 1
o
2M:
Again, as in Corollary 1, a negotiator never looses by facing fewer restrictions regarding
the revisions of claims below his maximal claim. The more a negotiator is susceptible
to feelings of frustration from unfullled expectations, the less procient he will be
in negotiating. If a negotiator acts as an agent of a principal, the higher his fear of
disappointing his principal, the less ambitious the targets set by his principal and the
7The solution u of a revision procedure with scalar multiplication belongs to
[i2N

c 2 PO (S)juKSi (1)  ci  ~cii
	
because the piecewise-linear revision procedure of Exam-
ple 1 which connects (p1 ;m
;1
2 (p

1)) and (m
;2
1 (p

2) ; p

2) for  > 1 implements u
 .
8 If bk i is a non-increasing concave function on [0; 1] for k = 1; :::K, then the pointwise inmum m
i
 i
is also a non-increasing concave function on [0; 1]. Since uP i is a decreasing concave function, b
k
 i is a
non-increasing concave function if bk i is a non-decreasing concave function or b¯
k
i is a non-decreasing
convex function.
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less favorable the resulting agreement.
6 Robustness
In this section, we justify some of the simplifying features of the mechanism  .
6.1 Player-specic revisions
We assumed that C1(p1)[C2(p2) is the set of feasible compromises. That is, any oppor-
tunity for compromise available to one player is also available to the other player. We
now consider player-specic revisions in ~  when each player i must make compromises
within his own set Ci(pi). This is the natural assumption in Example 3.
Player-specic revisions implement the same equilibrium allocation for the same
revision procedure not only if uKS (1) 2 C1(1) \ C2(1), but also when restraint in the
formulation of claims for obtaining a strong bargaining position equalizes the extended
Nash products. In the latter case, none of the players can impose a compromise that
is better than his maximal revision. The restriction of player-specic revisions has no
bite. When subcase (a) of case (ii) in Proposition 3 does not hold, the extended Nash
products are equalized and u = ~u:9
When subcase (a) of case (ii) holds, the weak player can no longer propose in the
strong players set of feasible compromises and the strong player can impose compro-
mises within his set of feasible compromises for his maximal claim. As in Nash demand
games, the utility allocation implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium is no longer
unique. The solutions are all Pareto-e¢ cient allocations ~u, giving utility not lower than
p^2m
2
1 (p^2) and not higher than m
1
2 (1).
Proposition 4. Assume that ~u is an allocation implemented in subgame-perfect
equilibrium in ~  with player-specic revisions for m 2 M. Then ~u = u, where u
is the solution in   for m, unless uKS (1) =2 C (1) and m12 (1) > m21 (p^2) p^2 when
~u 2  u 2 PO (S)j p^2m21 (p^2)  u2  m12 (1)	.
Proof. See appendix.
6.2 Competition for leadership
We assumed that leadership is given to the player bidding the lower resistance prob-
ability against an uncompromising opponent who gives an ultimatum, as in Moulins
auction game. If leadership were given to the player with higher resistance probability,
players could lead with maximal resistance against uncompromising followers. The fol-
lower would accept any compromise, including the leaders dictatorship, anticipating
9The bidding strategies may di¤er o¤ the equilibrium path of the subgame-perfect equilibrium with
player-specic revisions.
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the disagreement outcome after rejection. Hence both playersbids and claims would
be maximal in equilibrium.
Schelling (1956) discusses bargaining with ultimatums. He argues that adherence to
a commitment - leaving the negotiation table empty-handed - must be motivated and
communicated, so that it is recognized by the other party. In particular, "the process of
commitment may be a progressive one, the commitments acquiring their rmness by a
sequence of actions" (Schelling (1956), p. 296). In that case, competition of leadership
with and without bidding of resistance yields the same outcome. The equivalence
between bidding resistance probabilities and the gradual buildup of resistance is similar
to the equivalence between the sealed-bid rst-price and the Dutch auction. Assume
that after making claims both players increase resistance, simultaneously and at the
same pace, until one of the players stops and proposes a compromise. A player takes the
lead as soon as he is condent that his resistance probability to an uncompromising
opponent is su¢ ciently high to impose his compromise. The equilibrium strategies
when players bid for leadership or when resistance is built up until one player takes the
lead yield the same resistance probability.
6.3 Alternating o¤ers
We nally discuss ultimatums when the uncompromising follower has the option of
continuing negotiations with a countero¤er, as in the alternating-o¤er game of Ru-
binstein (1982). Even if leadership alternates exogenously, adding ultimatums as an
option of stopping negotiations induces restraint in the resistance probabilities as in
the four-stage mechanism with competition for leadership. After formulating claims
in the rst stage in the extensive form  , players take turns in making proposals in
their compromise set until one player accepts his opponents proposal or pursues his
claim in an ultimatum. In line with Rubinsteins game, we focus on the revision pro-
cedure for which all revisions are feasible in the mechanism  M . Hence players start
with formulating maximal claims in order to maximize their payo¤s as followers in an
ultimatum. The progressive process of commitment to a resistance probability in the
followers ultimatum is assumed to be time-consuming. The higher the probability of
disagreement, the longer it takes to convince ones opponent of ones rmness.10 Player
is discounted payo¤ of the compromise c for the resistance probability qi is exp( "qi)ci
for some positive ". Since delay is costly, the leader proposes as soon as he is condent
that he can block an ultimatum.
For each element of a decreasing sequence of small positive ", consider a compromise
proposal ci (") 2 PO (S) and resistance probability qi (") for each player i 2 N . For
10"Be willing to walk away from or back to negotiations", the guideline for the negotiator referred to
in the introduction, can be viewed as costly signalling of ones rmness to the follower. The commitment
to a higher resistance probability also takes more time in persuading ones principal of the need to be
rm. Remark that the leaders payo¤ in an ultimatum will be decreasing in the resistance probability
only when restrictions on the revision of claims induce restraint in the formulation of claims.
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the compromises to be proposed and accepted in equilibrium, one needs
c ii (") = exp( "qi("))cii(") = (1  q i(")) for all i 2 N . (4)
By the rst equality in (4), accepting the opponents o¤er c i(") is as good as waiting
for a time "qi(") before proposing ci(") for all i 2 N . For equal waiting times "qi(") =
"q i("), the Nash products of the proposals are equal, as in Rubinsteins game. By
the second equality in (4), accepting the opponents compromise c i(") is as good as
stopping with an ultimatum, in which case the initial claim is obtained with probability
1  q i("). Before player i can respond with a counterproposal or an ultimatum to the
proposal c i("), player  i has built up a resistance probability q i (") = ri
 
c ii (") ; 1

which deters an ultimatum, as in  M .
By combining the equalities in (4) for both i 2 N , it follows that
ln c22 (")  ln c12 (")
ln c11 (")  ln c21 (")
=
r1
 
c21 (") ; 1

r2
 
c12 (") ; 1
 = 1  c21 (")
1  c12 (")
:
For "! 0, c1(") and c2(") converge to c, which by lHopitals rule satises
 d ln c2
d ln c1

c2=u
P
2 (c1)
=
1  c1
1  c2
.
The lefthand side is increasing in c1 and equal to 1 for c = uN . The righthand
side is decreasing in c1 and equal to 1 for c = uKS (1) : Hence, the compromise c lies
strictly in between the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, unless both solutions
coincide.
Assume that uNi > u
KS
i (1). The introduction of ultimatums in Rubinsteins alter-
nating o¤er game moves the equilibrium solution away from the Nash solution towards
the proportional solution. When the Nash solution is proposed as a compromise, player
 is risk limit when pursuing his maximal claim is greater than player is risk limit
since uNi > u
N
 i. Player i needs more time to build up the necessary resistance, so that
his higher impatience inhibits him to obtain a compromise as good as uN . In Rubin-
steins game, the players impatience is exogenously determined by the waiting time
for making a counterproposal. In  M , the impatience of the players is endogenized by
the choice of resistance. A players impatience thus increases with his own payo¤ in
his compromise proposal, as he requires a higher resistance to make this compromise
acceptable.
Similarly, the introduction of alternating o¤ers in an extension of the four-stage
mechanism with unrestricted revisions moves the equilibrium solution away from the
proportional solution towards the Nash solution. Since the solution to  M implies
equal risk limits, its implementation in  M would imply equal waiting times between
alternating o¤ers equal to "qKS (1). However, for short equal waiting times, a com-
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promise is proposed and accepted only if the payo¤s are close to those in the Nash
solution. Proposing an o¤er which deters ultimatums is necessary but not su¢ cient for
its acceptance with an option to countero¤ers. The anticipation of countero¤ers with
ultimatums results in unequal waiting times. The player preferring the proportional
solution to the Nash solution will make a proposal which his opponent prefers to the
proportional solution. As this reduces the opponents risk limit, he can reduce his re-
sistance needed to block an ultimatum below qKS (1) and thus the time he must wait
before making his proposal.
7 Conclusion
We analyzed a simple, intuitive mechanism that implements a unique solution to the
bargaining problem with two players. The mechanism introduces ultimatums and the
need to build resistance or to revise claims in a compromise in order to discourage
negotiators to give ultimatums. We generate a whole family of solutions by varying
the extent to which claims can be revised during the negotiations. The Nash solution
is the unique equilibrium solution, if negotiators cannot revise claims. The ability to
revise claims was assumed to be beyond the control of the negotiators in the course of
negotiations. If a player has a claim for which he is strong for all claims of his opponent,
then he gains by reducing the room for compromise for his maximal claim without
jeopardizing his strong bargaining position. However in all other cases, if a negotiator
were to suppress his feelings of frustration or if he did not fear to disappoint his principal
by making large concessions, he would achieve better deals. In the evaluation of the
performance of a negotiator, results loom larger than circumstances under which his
results were achieved. Hence, it seems plausible that professional negotiators will strive
for more room to maneuver. Similarly, principals will learn by experience to give
discretionary power to their negotiators as to decide which concessions have to be
made. If restrictions on revisions of claims other than maximal claims are loosened
in conicts between experienced negotiators, the predicted allocation would be the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
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8 Appendix
8.1 The subgame-perfect equilibrium
Let  = (1; 2) be a strategy prole in   form 2M: The history h 1 2 H 1 at stage
 = 1; :::; 4 is recursively dened by h =
 
a ; h 1

and h0 2 ;, where a1 = p 2 D,
a2 = q 2 D, a3L = c 2 C (p) and a4F 2{Y,N}. The strategy of player i at stage  in
the subgame for the history h 1 in  is denoted by a ;i (h
 1). We denote by  the
strategy prole in subgame-perfect equilibrium in  .
Assuming that F accepts a compromise in a tie when cF = (1   qL)pF , by the
denition of the risk limit for h3 2 H3,
a4;F (h
3) =
(
Y if qL  rF (cF ; pF ) and pF > 0;
N otherwise.
The leader L proposes the compromise c 2 C (p), which is accepted by F and gives L
the largest payo¤, so that for h2 2 H2,
a3;L
 
h2
 2 arg max
u2C(p)

cLj aF (c; h2) = Y
	
:
Since rF (:; pF ) is decreasing, c = a
3;
L
 
h2
 2 PO (S) for qL = rF (cF ; pF ). The choices
a2;(h1) for h1 2 H1 and a1;(h0) in subgame-perfect equilibrium for  R are given in
Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Proposition 3.
8.2 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1.
The mechanism  M belongs to the class of mechanisms considered in Proposition
3. In  M , C1 (1) = C2 (1) = D, so that uKS (1) 2 C (1) for i 2 N and that case (i)
of Proposition 3 holds. We refer to the proof of the rst case of Lemma 1 to show
that players make the bids q = qKS (p) and the rst case in Proposition 3 showing that
uKS (1) is implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The mechanism  N belongs to the class of mechanisms considered in Proposition
3. In  N , mi i (pi) = u
P
 i (pi) for i 2 N . The extended Nash product of a claim of
a player in Proposition 3 is equal to the Nash product in that case. It is maximized
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for p^i = uNi for i 2 N and the maximized values are equal for the two players. For
p = p^ = uN , uN = m1 (p1) = m2 (p2) = uKS(p): We refer to the proof of Lemma 1 for
the bidding strategies with m11 = p1 and to the fourth case in Proposition 3 showing
that uN is implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We distinguish between four solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium implemented
in one of the following four cases.
In the rst case, exception (i) of Proposition 3 holds. The proportional solution is
a feasible compromise for p = 1 and, by Lemma 1, uKS (1) is implemented. Let s be
the strong player for p = 1. By Lemma 2, uKSs (1) for pw = 1 is a lower bound for
ss payo¤. By its monotonicity, the proportional solution would remain feasible and
would be implemented by Lemma 1 for a lower claim of player w, but would reduce ws
payo¤. For pw = 1; the payo¤ of player s is bounded from above by uKSs (1). Hence,
u = uKS (1) is the unique solution for p = 1 in the rst case. In the remaining cases,
the proportional solution is not feasible for p = 1.
In the second case, subcase (a) or (c) of (ii) of Proposition 3 holds. In subcase (a),
player 1 is strong for his maximal claim and obtains the payo¤max

uKS1 (1; p2) ;m
1
1 (1)
	
by Lemma 1. Since he is strong for p1 = 1 and for all claims of player 2, his claim
is maximal in equilibrium by Lemma 2. In subcase (c), player s is strong for ~ps = 1
and the claim ~pw: He obtains the payo¤ max

uKSs (~p) ;m
s
s (1)
	
by Lemma 1, which
is a lower bound of his payo¤ for ~pw by Lemma 2. Remark that the conditions
ms (1) = mw (~pw) = u
KS(~p) uniquely dene ~p  p^ by the properties of the proportional
solution. In both subcases, ms (1) is implemented i¤mss (1)  uKSs (p) for ps = 1: The
proportional solution remains feasible and would be implemented for claims below pw
of the weak player, but would reduce his payo¤ below msw (1). Hence u = m
s (1) is the
unique solution implemented when the maximal revisions are incompatible or meet for
ps = 1 in the second case.
In the third case, condition (b) of (ii) of Proposition 3 holds. The extended Nash
products are equal for p = (p1; p^2) ; so that player 1 is strong for p. Since the propor-
tional solution is not feasible for p, m1 (p1) is implemented by Lemma 1. Since p2 = p^2,
player 1 remains strong for p1 and all claims of player 2, so that player 1 never claims
less than p1 by Lemma 2. Remark that player 2 becomes strong for p^2 and any claim
of player 1 exceeding p1. Player 1s payo¤ cannot be improved upon for the claim p^2.
Hence, u = m1 (p1) is the unique solution for p1 and p^2 in the third case.
In the fourth case, the exceptions of Proposition 3 do not hold and there exists
(p1; p^2) dening equal extended Nash products for which C1 (p1) \ C2(p^2) 6= ;. If
C1 (p1) \C2(p2)  C1 (p1) \C2(p^2) and player s is strong for p  p^; his payo¤ is equal
to max

uKSs (p) ;m
s
s (ps)
	
by Lemma 1, which is a lower bound for the payo¤ of player
s for pw by Lemma 2. This lower bound is strictly decreasing in pw if uKSs (p) > m
s
s (ps)
by the monotonicity of the proportional solution. This lower bound cannot be reduced
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and player w cannot gain by increasing his claim as the weak player i¤ C1 (p1) \
C2(p2) =

uKS (p)
	
, implying that in the solution m1 (p1) = m2 (p2) = uKS (p) for
claims dening equal extended Nash products. These conditions uniquely identify
p  p^ by the properties of the proportional solution. None of the players can gain
by changing his claim. For a larger claim, the other player is strong and implements
his maximal revision without changing the utility allocation. For a lower claim, his
payo¤ is reduced in the proportional solution, which remains feasible and would be
implemented. Hence, u = m1 (p1) = m2 (p2) = uKS (p) is the unique solution in the
fourth case.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Assume that condition (a) of (ii) of Proposition 3 holds. In the subgame for the
claims p = (1; p^2), both players bid equal resistance probabilities in [1 (p) ; 2 (p)] and
player 1 proposes c 2 C1 (1) such that c2 = (1  q1) p^2 which is as good as player 2s
ultimatum. If q1 = 2 (p) = 1   m21 (p^2) =p1, then c2 = m21 (p^2) p^2 bounds player 2s
payo¤ from below. If q1 = 1 (p),m
1 (1) is imposed, which bounds player 1s payo¤ from
below. There are no protable deviations. Player 1 remains leader and proposes the
same compromise for a higher resistance probability of player 2. Player 2 would lead if
he lowers his or if player 1 increases his resistance probability. Either q2 = q1 = 2 (p),
m2 (p^2) is implemented and player 1 looses by increasing q1. Or player 2 is unable
to impose a compromise in C2 (p^2) and player 1 gives his ultimatum, giving a zero
payo¤ to player 2 and, by concavity of uP1 , (1  q1)uP1 (p^2)  uP1 ((1  q1) p^2) = uP1 (c2)
as payo¤ to player 1. Player 1 remains leader by lowering q1, but can only impose
compromises with higher payo¤ for player 2. Hence for the claims p, all proposals ~u for
which ~u2 2

m21 (p^2) p^2;m
1
2 (1)

can be implemented in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Any claim p01 < 1 of player 1 would reduce the lower bound m11 (1) on his payo¤ for
q1 = q2 = 2 (p
0
1; p^2) : Any other claim than p^2 of player 2 would reduce the lower bound
m21 (p^2) p^2 of player 2. Hence, p are the equilibrium claims when condition (a) of (ii)
of Proposition 3 holds.
Assume that condition (a) of (ii) of Proposition 3 does not apply. Then either
uKS (1) 2 C1 (1) \ C1 (1) for p = 1 or 2 (p) = 1 (p) in   for m 2 M and ~u = u can
be implemented in ~  for m. Since ~u 2 PO (S), these lower bounds cannot be improved
upon.
8.3 Proof of the Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1.
For any subgame with claims p which are not strictly compatible, uKS (p) is well
dened. By denition, qKS1 (p) = q
KS
2 (p) = ri
 
uKSi (p) ; pi

and uKSi (p) =pi = 1  
qKSi (p) for i 2 N . A proposal c of L is proposed and accepted for qL if and only if
qL  rF (cF ; pF ). By the monotonicity of rF (:; pF ), F rejects c0 if he strictly prefers c
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to c0. We derive the bids in subgame-perfect equilibrium for any subgame for p. We
distinguish between two cases when s is strong for p.
In the rst case, uKSs (p)  mss (ps) ; so that uKS (p) 2 Cs (ps)  C (p) and the
proportional solution is feasible. We distinguish between two subcases.
In the rst subcase, uKSs (p) < ps, so that ri
 
uKSi (p) ; pi

> 0 and uPi (p i) <
uKSi (p) < pi for i 2 N . For the bidding q = qKS (p), q1 = q2: The allocation would
remain unchanged for a higher bid of player i 2 N , since player  i would be the leader
for q i and would propose uKS (p) which would be accepted by player i. The utility
of a lower bidder i would be reduced. As a leader, either he proposes an acceptable
o¤er which reduces his payo¤ by the monotonicity of r i (:; p i) or he proposes an
unacceptable o¤er yielding (1  qi)uPi (p i)  uPi (p i) < uKSi (p). Since no player has
a protable deviation, q = qKS (p) is an equilibrium for p. Moreover, player i 2 N
ensures a payo¤ which is bounded below by uKSi (p) for the bid qi = q
KS
i (p). Since
uKS (p) 2 PO (S), the lower bound for one player sets an upper bound on the payo¤
for the other player. Hence L proposes uKS (p), F accepts and both players bid qKSi (p)
in equilibrium for the claims p.
In the second subcase, uKSs (p) = ps, so that u
KS
i (p) = pi and ri
 
uKSi (p) ; pi

= 0
for i 2 N . If uKSw (p) > mww (ps) ; qw = 0 is the only way for w to avoid that s acquires
leadership for qs > 0 and makes a proposal in Cw (pw) which s would prefer to uKS (p)
and which w would accept as a follower: Hence, uKS (p) is implemented for qw = 0 and
qs 2 [0; 1]. If uKSw (p) = mww (ps), that is C (p) =

uKS (p)
	
, L has no other option
than to propose uKS (p) and leadership is valuable for none of the players. Hence,
qi 2 [0; 1] for i 2 N implements uKS (p). It follows that uKS (p) is implemented in
equilibrium. Conclude that in the rst case, the proportional solution is the unique
solution implemented in equilibrium whenever it is feasible for claims p.
In the second casemss (ps) > u
KS
s (p), so that u
KS (p) =2 Cs (ps) and rs (mss (ps) ; ps) <
qKS1 (p) = q
KS
2 (p). By (2), it follows that w (p)  s (p) > qKSs (p), so that rs (mss (ps) ; ps) <
s (p) and u
KS (p) =2 Cw (pw). It follows that uKS (p) =2 C (p), so that the proportional
solution is not feasible. We show that ms (ps) is implemented for the equilibrium bids
qw 2 [rs(mss (ps) ; ps); s (p)];
qs 2
(
[s (p) ; w (p)]
[s (p) ; w (p))
if s = 1;
if s = 2:
If w = L, then qw  qs < w (p) or q2 < q1 = 2 (p) and s rejects proposals in Cw (pw) :
As a result, w cannot do better than by proposing ms (ps) in Cs (ps) which is accepted
by s for qw  rs (mss (ps) ; ps). If s = L, then qs = s (p) for qw  s (p) implies that
ms (ps) is accepted by w and that any better proposal for s in Cs (ps) n fms (ps)g, if
any, is rejected by w. The payo¤ of player i 2 N is bounded below by msi (p) for these
bids. Sincems (p) 2 PO (S), the lower bound for one player sets an upper bound on the
payo¤ for the other player. Hence, ms (ps) is implemented for the bids q in equilibrium.
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Remark that ms (ps) would also be implemented for qw 2 [0; 1] if Cs (ps) = fms (ps)g
and s has no other choice than to proposems (ps) as a leader. We show that some player
has a protable deviation for all other bidding strategies. For qw < rs (mss (ps) ; ps),
w = L and proposes u 2 PO (Cs (ps)) for which us = (1  qw) ps > mss (ps). For
qw > s (p) and Cs (ps) 6= fms (ps)g, s = L for qw > qs > s (p) and can impose a
preferred compromise in Cs (ps) n fms (ps)g. For qs < s (p), s = L when player w
chooses qw = s (p) and player s must propose in Cw (pw). Finally, for qs > w (p) if
s = 1 and qs  w (p) if s = 2, w = L for qw = w (p) and can propose in Cw (pw).
Hence, if any player were to change his bidding strategy, his payo¤would be lower than
the one in ms (ps). We conclude that ms (ps) is implemented in equilibrium when the
proportional solution is not feasible for p.
Proof of Lemma 2.
For strictly compatible claims p, m11 (p1)  p1 < uP1 (p2)  m21 (p2). Player 1 is
leader by bidding q1 = 0. For this bid, player 2s ultimatum and player 1s proposal 
uP1 (p2) ; p2

are equivalent. Let player 2 bid q2 2 [0; 1] if m22 (p2) = p2.and q2 = 0
if m22 (p2) < p2. In the former, player 2 accepts
 
uP1 (p2) ; p2

, player 1s preferred
outcome in C (p) : In the latter, player 2 would be leader for q1 > 0 and
 
p1; u
P
2 (p1)

would be implemented, reducing player 1s payo¤. Hence,
 
uP1 (p2) ; p2

is implemented
in a subgame with strictly compatible claims p. Formulating strictly compatible claims
cannot occur in subgame-perfect equilibrium, since the strictly compatible claims p0,
p01 = p1 and p02 > p2 increase player 2s payo¤ and player 2 has a protable deviation.
Assume that s is strong in the subgame for claims p which are not strictly com-
patible. By Lemma 1, u is the strong players preferred option in C^s (p) for the
claims p. By the monotonicity of the proportional solution and the comprehensive-
ness of the revision procedure, max

mii (pi) ; u
KS
i (p)
	
is strictly increasing in pi. If
ps < p^s, then by claiming p^s, player s would remain strong and increase his pay-
o¤ for given pw. Since protable deviations of one player are excluded, ps  p^s in
subgame-perfect equilibrium. If pw < p^w and uKSs (p)  mss (ps), then the proportional
solution is implemented and player w could increase his payo¤ for a larger claim for
given ps. If pw < p^w and uKSs (p) < m
s
s (ps), then m
s (ps) is implemented. By claiming
p^w, either player w becomes strong for p0, p0w = p^w and p0s = ps and would obtain
max

mww (p^w) ; u
KS
w (p
0)
	  uKSw (p0) > uKSw (p). Or player s remains strong for p^w,
ms (ps) is implemented and msw (ps) ps  mws (p^w) p^w > mws (pw) pw. Player s would
remain strong and would gain for a claim larger than ps  p^s for given pw. Since prof-
itable deviations of one player are excluded, pw  p^w in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Consider any subgame with claims p  p^ implementing u. If player s is strong for p,
he remains strong for p0s 2 [p^s; ps] and for p0w = pw. Hence, us = max

mss (ps) ; u
KS
s (p)
	 
max

mss (p
0
s) ; u
KS
s (p
0)
	
. Moreover, if s is strong for p and for all claims of player w,
then he will never claim less than ps in subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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8.4 Proof of the Corollary
Proof of Corollary 1.
We distinguish between two cases. In the rst case, condition (i) of Proposition 3
holds for m, so that u = uKS (1) 2 C (1). Since C (1)  C (1), uKS (1) 2 C (1) for
m. It follows that u = u and p = p = 1. In the second case uKS (1) =2 C (1), so that
uKS (1) =2 C (1) and condition (i) of Proposition 3 does not hold for m as well as for
m. It su¢ ces to consider three subcases. Remark that maxp1 m
1
2 (p1) p1  m12 (p^1) p^1 
m21 (p^2) p^2, so that the labeling of the players is the same for m as for m.
In the rst subcase, subcase (a) of Proposition 3 holds for m. Since m1 (1) = m1 (1)
and m2 = m2, this subcase also holds for m, so that u1 = u1 and p1 = p1 = 1.
In the second subcase, subcase (b) of Proposition 3 holds for m. Since m12 (p1) p1 
m12 (p1) p1 = m
2
1 (p^2) p^2; player 1 is strong for any claim of player 2 when claiming p1
for m, so that p1  p1 by Lemma 2 and u1  u1 when m1 (p1) is implemented
In the third subcase, the exceptions of Proposition do not hold or subcase (c) of (ii)
holds. There exists p such that m1 (p1) = m2 (p2) = uKS (p) for m. Since the extended
Nash products are equal, player 1 is the strong player. Since m12 (p1)  m12 (p1) and
m2 = m2, player 1 remains strong for p and for m. By Lemma 2 for m, player
1s payo¤ is not smaller than max

m11 (p1) ; u
KS
1 (p)
	
for p2. If m1 (p1) = m1 (p1) ;
u1 = u1 and there exist a claim for player 1 for which p1 = p1. If m1 (p1) > m1 (p1),
then m11 (p1) > u
KS
1 (p) and m
1
1 (p1) is implemented for p by Lemma 1. Since player 2
remains weak for larger claims than p2, u1 > u1. For p, the equality of the extended
Nash products must be restored, either for p2 = p^2; as in the second subcase or for
m1 (p1) = m
2 (p2) = u
KS (p). In both cases, p1 > p1.
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